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To plan is to choose.
Choose to go forward.
- Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere
Introduction
By 1995, fourteen countries in SSA were facing the challenge of post-war reconstruction after 
protracted conflicts that shattered economies and disintegrated states.1 As of mid 1998, twenty 
of the world’s thirty-five poorest countries were either in or had recently emerged from a civil 
war. In Africa, armed conflict is now one of the main factors responsible for more than the 
estimated 250 million people, almost half of the total population, who now live in poverty." In 
these countries, which are among the poorest in the world, the existing problems of natural 
disasters such as droughts and poverty, insecurity, underdevelopment and instability are 
compounded -  or indeed dwarfed - by those flowing from the violence of war, creating what are 
now fashionably captioned ‘complex political emergencies’ (CPEs).
Cessation of hostilities provides an opportunity for some of these countries to rebuild their 
societies, economies, and polities and to start reforms and restructuring that may have 
previously proved unattainable. In recent years as an increasing proportion of aid is spent on 
emergency-related programmes, there has been a growing interest in the rehabilitation of 
societies emerging from war and a parallel (though not adequately financed) priority for
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accountable and competent governance. While the nature and the extent of devastation faced by 
war-torn societies vary, they all face common issues concerning social and political 
rehabilitation, the macro-economic management of reconstruction, demobilization and 
reintegration of ex-combatants, alternative routes to livelihood rehabilitation, and the role of 
different aid instruments.3 Countries such as Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda, Ethiopia, 
Somaliland, and Eritrea are currently in the transition period of post-conflict rehabilitation.4 
Nevertheless, the high levels of violence still plaguing Rwanda and Uganda, the simmering 
border-war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the renewed civil war in Congo (ex-Zaire) and the 
problematic situation in Angola are testament to the fragility of the “post” in post-war states. 
Yet there remains little understanding of how conflict-affected societies should be helped to 
rebuild their countries. This is partly because the concept of rehabilitation now dominant is 
largely rooted in mechanisms and narratives related to natural disasters. Rehabilitation and 
reconstruction are also still narrowly conceived in terms of centralised infrastructural 
development -  a legacy of Western Europe’s experience. t
Conceptualising Rehabilitation - A Critical Review
Although cases of attempted rehabilitation of war-tom societies have grown rapidly since the 
mid-1980s, the concept of rehabilitation has not changed equally rapidly.5 Rehabilitation after 
natural disasters involves mainly reconstruction of physical infrastructure and providing interim 
basic needs to affected persons in peacetime. It usually entails limited (by area or by degree) 
physical damage and temporary livelihood curtailment, not destruction of state structures and 
livelihoods. In this vein, rehabilitation is more about how to rebuild what was destroyed in the 
disaster rather than what to rebuild. Intervention needs after natural calamities are more specific 
because they are clearer and “there are identifiable communities to rebuild, recognised political
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authorities in the areas receiving aid, [and] a legal system in place” .6 In a post-war era, the 
situation is significantly different, as prolonged conflicts corrode the social, political and 
economic institutions. They involve fundamental questions not only on what to reconstruct but 
also how to do so in order not to recreate the unsustainable institutions and structures that 
originally contributed to the conflict. Even more crucial is rehabilitation of governmental 
legitimacy and ability to deliver basic services including user friendly law and order.
Consideration of rehabilitation during and after CPEs requires an innovative approach. First, 
due to the contested nature of the state and its post war political structures as it emerges from 
war, it is either very weak or lacks legitimacy. Prior to initiation and throughout its life-cycle, 
rehabilitative intervention should involve careful analysis of the root causes and the dynamics of 
the conflict interpreting “humanitarian crises not primarily as material supply crises, but rather 
as crises of economic, political, and social systems”.7 Failure to recognise the importance of 
political reconstruction and restructuring is one of the main reasons why “successful 
rehabilitation is still more of a hope than a reality”.8
There is a need to reconsider rehabilitation by “moving beyond a relief-oriented, supply-driven 
approach to rehabilitation”.9 In countries where the state is contested such as Rwanda and 
Angola, or has disintegrated/collapsed such as Somalia and Afghanistan “and traditional 
institutions have re-emerged as an important force, there is a need to think beyond state-defined 
models”.10 Though previously considered" there needs to be a greater exploration of the 
somewhat artifactual division between state and traditional authorities resulting largely from 
analysis of the colonial era. Political rehabilitation in these societies might on occasion take the 
form of helping the rebuilding of traditional authorities rather than imposing western style state 
structures of the type that had collapsed.12
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Second, complex emergencies have no clear beginning nor end and the return to “normalcy” is 
lengthy. There often exists a situation of uneasy peace in the post-conflict transition 
characterised by a highly unstable environment. In that context it may be difficult to identify 
whether conditions are appropriate for serious rehabilitation work. And yet the timing of 
rehabilitation, the seizure of a “window of opportunity” is crucial. Its weakness or robustness 
may make the difference between consolidation of peace or the return to war. Macrae, Zwi et 
al.n identify the signing of peace accords, process of political change, increased levels of 
security and existence of opportunity for peace and reconstruction as the key features of a post­
conflict situation, though they may not all be present at the same time. While comprehending 
the causes of conflict is usually a necessary condition for mastering them,14 it is neither an early 
warning system nor a sufficient condition. Nevertheless, full comprehension may not be needed 
to have early warning of conflict.15
But there is little reason to envision comprehension as an automatic cure or to contend that 
conflict is always irrational from the perspective of key actors. Indeed, conflicts generally arise 
from issues relating to self-respect (or pride), self-identity (or chauvinism), fear (whether from a 
guilty conscience or a neighbour perceived as evil) or greed (demand for equity). These are not 
inherently irrational driving forces. Further, even if key actors misperceive reality, that 
misperception is in itself a fact with consequences until changed.16 Somali warlords, marauding 
militias in war ravaged countries, and certain entrepreneurs of adversity do benefit from war. 
So too might certain broader groupings if speedy victory over a country with a strong economy 
-  or at least some strong surplus generating sectors, e.g. Angola - could be achieved.
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Third, CPEs undermine or destroy the social fabric of the society, weakening the capacities of 
the communities and their chances of recovery to the extent that even after the conflict they 
remain extremely vulnerable.17 Wars do not affect all groups equally. Vulnerable groups, 
including ethnic minorities, women and children usually bear the brunt of conflict.18 Rebuilding 
social capital and livelihood systems in such circumstances is therefore more complex and 
difficult than restoring physical infrastructure in natural disasters. It involves, among other 
things, “redefining and reorienting relationships between political authority and the citizenry, 
revisiting relationships between different ethnic and social groups, creating a civil society in its 
broadest sense, promoting psychosocial healing and reconciliation, and reforming economic 
policies and institutions”.19 Reconceptualising rehabilitation is also based on the recognition of 
“a failure of existing models of development to provide the conditions required for political and 
economic stability” and the need to re-evaluate development goals in fragile, insecure and 
highly unstable environments.20
Fourth, intervention aid in complex emergencies is often highly politicised as are domestic 
rehabilitation resource allocations. Reconceptualising rehabilitation “requires acknowledging 
that neither relief, rehabilitation, nor development assistance is politically neutral”.21 It is also 
important to rethink through whom rehabilitation aid is channeled. International Non 
Governmental Organisations (INGOs) and local NGOs (LNGOs), while relatively successful in 
rehabilitation initiatives in the aftermath of natural disasters, are less so in post-conflict 
rehabilitation due to their limited conceptual grasp of the situation, legitimacy, and efforts to 
promote sustainability. Yet a significant proportion of rehabilitation aid to war-torn societies 
(other than major infrastructure projects and financial sector restructuring) is still disbursed 
through NGOs.
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Finally, gender considerations are -  or should be - central to post-conflict rehabilitation 
modeling. One of the consequences of war has always been significant changes in women’s 
role as pre-war gender inequalities and traditions perforce change during war situations.22 In 
Rwanda since a substantial majority of those killed in the war were men, women - who in some 
parts of the country are up to 80 per cent of the adult population - became responsible for 
rebuilding livelihoods.2' In other countries such as Eritrea, Tigray and Somalia it appears that 
the social dislocation in these societies has empowered women.24 From a gender perspective, 
post-conflict rehabilitation needs to take into account the new roles of women.
What exactly constitutes rehabilitation or how this concept is linked to relief and development is 
also a subject of continuing debate. Most definitions of rehabilitation used by agencies describe 
it as activities of limited duration started soon after disaster.25 The UK ’s Department for 
International Development (DFID) limits rehabilitation to programmes carried out under 
emergency relief with a particular emphasis on meeting basic needs. It defines rehabilitation 
assistance as “the provision of aid designed to help restore emergency-affected populations to 
self-reliance in meeting basis needs, and to reduce their vulnerability to future emergencies”26. 
In an attempt to link rehabilitation to relief and development, Harvey and Cambell27 suggest 
that:
rehabilitation ... is part of a process of protecting and promoting the livelihoods of 
people enduring or recovering from emergencies. It aims to provide short-term income 
transfers, rebuild household and community assets, and rebuild institutions. Its key task 
is to help reinforce developmental objectives, notably livelihood security, participation, 
sustainability, gender equity, and local institutional capacity.
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These definitions are narrow considering the range of activities that rehabilitation after war 
should cover, but they are somewhat broader than those used by most agencies. In practice they 
reflect the operational definitions of NGOs which normally do not include macro-economic and 
political components of rehabilitation. This partly explains why most rehabilitation 
interventions in post-crisis situations - especially as perceived by external aid agencies and 
NGO’s - consist of individual programmes that are implemented mainly at local level and with 
few links with other reconstruction interventions. Rehabilitation initiatives have often focused 
on specific operations that lacked the kind of coherent, integrated framework needed for 
realistic sustainable macro-economic and household livelihood rehabilitation. Part of the 
problem is “the absence of mechanisms to link donors with a national policy framework, 
combined with the high degree of donor dependence on NGOs for project design and 
implementation, [which] tends to reinforce the inclination of rehabilitation programmes to adopt 
the highly decentralised, unintegrated approaches of relief rather than those of development”.28
Equally, the short-term nature of donor funding of rehabilitation programmes does not easily 
lead to achieving sustainable rehabilitation efforts. Because of lack of long-term resource 
commitments by the international community, many rehabilitation programmes are little more 
than crisis management interventions. These activities “are neither conceived nor implemented 
as sustainable programmes”.29 Separate budget lines and a lack of clarity as to what type of 
projects and programmes should fall under rehabilitation further complicate the problem. For 
instance, rehabilitation aid in most international agencies comes under emergency relief 
departments and follows procedures similar to those used for emergency aid. It often has no 
macro framework, no link to long term development strategy and little or no interaction with 
development allocations to the same country. A further problem of this type of approach to 
rehabilitation is to do with the pace with which programmes are identified and implemented.
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Consequently, they are not subjected to stringent criteria used in the appraisal of development 
programmes. Well-intentioned though they may be, such interventions may even exacerbate 
existing problems.
Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
Until recently rehabilitation has been viewed as almost uniquely a transitional activity on the 
relief-development continuum. This is not surprising given the nature of contemporary 
emergencies. In SSA internal wars, for example, there may be no clear end to the conflict and 
therefore rehabilitation may be carried out while the conflict is still going on in parts of the 
country. Indeed, relief, rehabilitation and development may all take place simultaneously within 
a state -  emergency relief or post conflict rehabilitation in some regions and development in 
others. These three concepts are now generally recognised as separate but overlapping and 
complementary.
The rationale behind the conceptual and strategic linking of relief, rehabilitation and 
development is the belief that relief and rehabilitation programmes can and should include 
development objectives. Development can limit the need for subsequent emergency relief; 
‘relief can contribute to development and especially reduction of future vulnerability to certain 
types of catastrophe; and ‘rehabilitation’ can ease the transition between the two. However, the 
concept of divisions between and interrelationships among emergency, non-emergency, relief 
and non-relief assistance no longer exists in the contemporary complex emergencies in Africa. '0 
The crisis in Rwanda “does not represent a linear ‘continuum’ from relief-to-rehabilitation-to- 
development. Rehabilitation efforts necessarily began soon after the new government assumed
power in July 1994. Massive relief operations continue, 18 months later, in refugee camps on 
Rwandese borders”.31
In a linear sequence model, rehabilitation is seen as the link between relief and renewed 
development and it is assumed that the two concepts are sufficiently compatible to allow for this 
continuum. However, the linearity of the continuum is for some authors conceptual not one of 
time sequences. For example in many African countries - notably Somalia and Somaliland - 
severe droughts are cyclically recurring facts making one-off approaches based on uniqueness 
fatuous.32 But rehabilitation cannot reconcile what are sometimes asserted to be two entirely 
different concepts. These distinctions mainly reflect the organisation of aid agencies rather than 
the reality of affected people.'3 However, they may sometimes also reflect realities on the 
ground. If a zone is temporarily at peace, local governmental, infrastructural and basic service 
provision rehabilitation is feasible but can be swept away in (literally) a day if the underlying 
conflict remains and areas of violence shift rapidly and unpredictably. Only straight relief has 
clear dividends if there is an acute risk of renewed hostilities.
Nevertheless, the distinction between pure survival and development assistance is an important 
one both in terms of scale and eligibility. Donors are generally cautious in granting recognition 
to transition authorities before a legitimate government is formed. Access to international 
development assistance depends on the existence of an internationally recognised government, 
whereas humanitarian assistance (relief and to some extent rehabilitation) are delivered to 
authorities that do not have international recognition or are viewed as unstable or dubiously 
based. Thus, “if rehabilitation is seen primarily as a development activity, rather than as a relief 
intervention, the presence and recognition of a legitimate national government will be a 
necessary condition for international finance”.34 Moreover, some of the criteria used for
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determining eligibility for development aid such as political conditionality reinforce the 
distinction between humanitarian and development assistance. For instance, aid given to 
countries such as Sudan which do not meet the criteria for development aid is mainly 
humanitarian. In Rwanda the issue of legitimacy of the new government is one of the reasons 
why provision of financial assistance to the government remains slow.35 There is also a related 
distinction as to sustainability - rehabilitation, if successful should become self-sustaining, 
survival support by definition depends on outside (external or domestic) funding.
Strategic Approaches to Reconstruction
What strategic approaches and policies can be adopted to promote realistic rehabilitation and 
provide a basis for sustainable peace and development? There is widespread consensus36 over 
the importance of understanding how local people rebuild their livelihoods, the importance of 
extending local level reconstruction programmes to regional and national levels, addressing the 
underlying causes of conflict, and looking at mechanisms for the promotion of local governance. 
These issues are explored in the following section under the three main components of social 
rehabilitation, political rehabilitation and economic rehabilitation.
Social Rehabilitation - Rebuilding Livelihoods and Civil Institutions
Violent conflicts undermine social networks and often leave a legacy of divided societies at 
all levels from family outwards.37 Rehabilitation assistance should provide the framework for 
reviving livelihoods and civil institutions previously suppressed, eroded or rendered 
powerless by war, with the aim of strengthening local capacities to participate in the 
reconstruction process. Effective civil society structures ensure that local people are
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represented and have voice in setting reconstruction priorities and that central authorities are 
more informed and responsive to their needs and priorities. This is particularly important in 
post-conflict situations in which political participation allows groups to articulate their 
diverse interests in the elaboration of reconstruction strategies. Civil society can make 
important contributions by providing counter balance to the power of central authorities or by 
providing basic essential services at the local and national levels.
Frustratingly, the basic Christian, Muslim, women’s, trade union and peasant civil society 
bodies are usually not defined as NGOs. Those which are so defined usually have very narrow 
membership bases and are (even when genuine) more like professional consulting co-ops than 
people’s social bodies. Relatedly, in conflict situations, it is particularly important to rebuild 
and strengthen the indigenous dispute resolution systems that may have been undermined by the 
breakdown of community networks. This involves “recognising and revitalising the elders 
council, the role of the traditional peacemaker, the justice circle, the tribal court, representative 
committees, or the mediating role of women’s organisations”.38
At the same time, it is important to avoid naivete and not cast civil society as composed solely 
of “angelic groups”. Civil society bodies reflect and embody the tensions in their communities: 
seeking to manipulate as often as to transcend them. The Interahamwe in Rwanda was a civil 
society body responsive to one set of community fears and concerns. The extreme polarisation 
into violence - indeed genocide - it exemplified was also present within religious and other civil 
society groups. Similarly the South African Broederbund was in origin an ‘oppressed majority’ 
(within the white community) people's body seeking cultural, social, economic and political 
security. Equally lineage, sub-clan, clan and clan family groupings are all civil society groups, 
both in Somalia and Somaliland as are similar groups and tribes in many other African
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countries. But their objective impacts on issues of violent or peaceful dispute resolution and 
ability to perceive ways to transcend armed conflict vary sharply at each level, lead to tension 
within civil society arenas and appear to have divergent overall balances among groups and over 
time.
Rebuilding trust and re-establishing community-wide interactions may be a first step in helping 
conflict-affected societies to rebuild their social capital. Rebuilding social capital helps local 
institutions to take on a more positive, less narrowly communal and more politically influential 
role in reconciliation, reconstruction and sustainable development aimed at transcending, not 
exploiting or exacerbating, conflict.
Demobilisation, Reintegration and Resettlement
Demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants in countries emerging from wars is a critical 
step in the process of social rehabilitation and a major challenge for authorities and donor 
agencies supporting rehabilitation efforts. The process of demobilisation is mainly concerned 
with the disarming of former soldiers and other armed groups and the facilitation of voluntary 
return of ex-combatants and their families, whereas reintegration involves supporting their re­
entry into productive civilian life. Generally up to 90 % of combatants - though not necessarily 
displaced persons including refugees - lack transferable skills and have little or no formal 
education since most of them are often recruited in the rural areas.39 Reintegration of child 
soldiers, women fighters and young people also poses particular problems. The priority 
accorded to such programmes and how the whole issue is perceived tend to depend on how the 
war ended. If in a negotiated settlement, then high priority is likely to be given to some 
measures in support of all demobilised combatants. But where a total military victory has been
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won there may be little or no direct targeting of defeated ex-combatants beyond whatever 
general programmes exist for rural returnees.
Demobilisation and re-integration issues need to be addressed at the earliest opportunity in the 
transition from war to peace. The timeliness of this is important because demilitarisation and 
reintegration are preconditions for reviving civil society, reducing fear and social tension and 
restoring confidence and a sense of security. Reducing the risks of renewed conflict depends to 
a large extent on the success of efforts aimed at demobilising and reintegrating ex-combatants 
and the leaders of organisations commanding their trust. By making ex-combatants productive 
members of the society, reintegration and demobilisation programmes also promote economic 
recovery.
Political Rehabilitation
This is arguably the most critical of all rehabilitation efforts. The cessation of formal hostilities 
or the signing -  and even formal implementation - of peace accords does not mean a return to 
normalcy. In war-torn societies political rehabilitation takes place in highly polarised settings 
where there are deep suspicions between warring factions. In many cases, “extremist factions of 
warring parties constantly strive to undermine the peace accords. The case is even worse in 
countries where one party emerges victorious and sees little need for making significant political 
concessions”.40 The latter point does not always hold -  a militarily victorious coalition or party 
may perceive itself as having the short-term capacity to seek political reconstruction aimed at 
transcending past causes of conflict, in addition to the incentive to reduce simmering violence 
and avert its full-scale re-emergence.
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A major weakness in political rehabilitation initiatives is that there is a lack of a “well-defined 
framework for political reform and reconstruction that informs its interventions”E rro r! 
Reference source not found ..41 Social rehabilitation programmes such as repatriation and 
resettlement, educational, and health services have been more successful than political 
reconstruction. This may be partly due to the long involvement of NGOs in particular 
development programmes in these sectors or their immediacy. However, if this leads to 
substitution of NGOs for government actors, short term results may be bought at the cost of 
delaying or blocking political rehabilitation which cannot go far if the state is unable to build a 
significant capacity to deliver real services to real people. In reflecting on the international 
community’s apparent dearth of insight into political rehabilitation, Kumar42 argues that:
those charged with designing and implementing political rehabilitation interventions 
lack appropriate conceptual frameworks, intervention models, concepts, policy 
instruments, and methodologies for assistance programmes to rebuild civil society, 
establish and nurture democratic institutions, promote a culture favourable to the 
protection of human rights, reconstruct law enforcement systems, or facilitate ethnic 
reconciliation in a highly unstable political and social environment.
Crucially, there is also the question over the appropriate balance of channels for rehabilitative 
aid. Who should be the recipient partners: civil society, local authorities, regional or central 
authorities, existing government, transitional authority, or unrecognised authorities. Macrae43 
argues that while the importance of rebuilding public administration capable of delivering 
public services is recognised, rehabilitation aid in the post-conflict period mostly by-passes 
central authorities so the recognition is more rhetorical than operational. This reflects the 
reluctance of the international community to engage directly with new regimes or transition
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authorities or with domestic civil society actors other than those analogous to Northern NGOs. 
A further problem with NGOs is that their priorities may conflict with those of local authorities. 
Reconstruction processes may be delayed by major gaps that appear as some sectors are 
completely ignored. Moreover, too many uncoordinated actors can lead to fragmentation of 
institutions and the irregular provision of services, leading to differential access to public 
services.
Economic Rehabilitation: From War And Survival Economy To Market Economy
Depending on the nature and length of the conflict and the conditions of the pre-war situation, 
internal wars usually have very high human and economic costs. The primary task of post­
conflict economic rehabilitation is therefore to understand the costs of the war and to establish 
priorities for economic, and especially livelihood, recovery. At the macro level, priorities for 
economic rehabilitation will include macro-economic stability and economic reform in order to 
reverse the extreme macro-economic disequilibria inherited from the economic policies 
followed (often necessarily) during the war. This is important for reviving savings and 
investment, containing inflation and removing regulations and controls that are often introduced 
during the conflict. At the micro level, it means providing support to households to rebuild their 
livelihood systems, and paying greater attention to the new role of women in the aftermath of 
war. Unsurprisingly, the macro and micro interact. Small farming (or herding) households are 
historically central not simply to their own subsistence but to urban food and raw material 
supplies, urban goods and services markets, indirect tax revenue and exports. Their revival is, 
therefore, strategically and macro economically as well as socially and politically important - 
e.g. in Mozambique, Somaliland, Somalia and Rwanda.
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It is now recognised “that rebuilding institutional infrastructure shattered during conflict is as 
important as physical infrastructure - if not more im portant... unfortunately, this is an area that 
has been largely overlooked”.44 For example rural households need market access to rehabilitate 
livelihoods. While road rehabilitation is central, access also hinges on the restoration of ‘user 
friendly’ civil police to achieve law and order and of financial institutions that lend to 
rural/small town oriented produce buyers, traders, transporters for vehicles and working capital 
(stocks of goods).
Macroeconomic Rehabilitation
Achieving macro-economic stability is essential for the transition from a highly distorted, 
survival oriented war economy to a more household friendly and market economy. Stability is 
also integral for sustainable economic recovery and growth. Governments engaged in post­
conflict rehabilitation often inherit bloated military and/or excruciatingly understaffed civil 
bureaucracies together with serious fiscal and balance of payments problems. In conflict 
situations, authorities also expand their nominal controls and regulations over all sectors of the 
economy while also rapidly losing ability to influence actual transactions or to collect revenue.
Economic reforms in the aftermath of conflicts should involve a set of measures aimed at 
achieving manageable balance-of-payments and public sector deficits and achieving structural 
change to prevent future payments and stabilisation crises. The first set of measures should 
involve stabilisation programmes that combine fiscal and monetary reform coupled with a 
currency devaluation. (The likelihood of an undervalued currency or low levels of inflation at 
the end of a civil war is negligible.) In the post-crisis period, it is argued that governments may 
not be able to increase their revenue by raising taxes as this might damage economic revival
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resulting in an increased reliance on cutting public expenditure to achieve macro-economic 
stability. This is a valid argument for cutting military spending (which Ethiopia appears to have 
done by well over 50%) and, where present, massive expenditure on ‘air’ (to use the evocative 
Ugandan term for official corruption or total non-transparency). However, in virtually all post­
war contexts, radically increased government spending on health, education, water, transport 
and communications and paying real public service wages compatible with enhancing 
productivity and professionalism are necessary conditions for sustainable state capacity and 
legitimacy and household livelihood and human capital restoration and development. If these 
cannot be initially financed by improved collection of taxes (usually very poor in war periods in 
Sub Saharan Africa), reallocation of external fund flows is crucial to rapid, sustainable 
rehabilitation.
The second set of reforms is medium-term adjustment that aims to reorient the structure of the 
economy to encourage greater efficiency in resource allocation and investment. This is 
concerned with “measures including trade and price liberalisation, and institutional and sectoral 
reforms [with] ... aims to remove a wide range of distortions in production and factor 
markets”.4'' Adjustment in post-conflict periods will aim to reverse the switch from tradables to 
non-tradables and from production for market exchange to production for subsistence.
Even so, there is little agreement on how adjustment programmes should proceed during the 
period of transition. Azam and Bevan46 maintain that speedy, radical reforms can be undertaken 
during the post-conflict period. But this is disputed by others47 who point out that models of 
economic reform used in peacetime may be inappropriate and even counter-productive in post­
conflict reconstruction. According to Fitzgerald and Stewart “it is necessary to specify the way 
in which civil society - firms and households - responds to the shocks and uncertainties of war
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in order to understand the macro-economic behaviour under conflict conditions”.48 They 
advocate an alternative economic reform that considers the changes in a war-economy’s 
economic performance. A related point is how perceptions and responses alter as conflict levels 
decline. Experience in both Mozambique and Somaliland suggests rapid transformation is 
possible even during periods before conflict is fully contained let alone eliminated.
Irrespective of the model of reform, adjustment policies entail social costs that need to be 
recognised. For example, the removal of subsidies and reduced expenditure on public services 
may negatively affect the most vulnerable groups who, as a result, are forced to pay more for 
food while enduring with fewer public services. Similarly, privatisation and the dismantling of 
parastatals may result in increased unemployment and further fragmentation of essential 
services. In this manner, the goals of economic policy should not be limited to macro-economic 
stabilisation and standard structural adjustment but should also aim to bolster peace efforts. A 
flexible approach is required in post conflict situations to avoid past mistakes. For instance, the 
Word Bank has been accused of having “overlookjed] ... potentially explosive social and 
political consequences when designing and imposing economic conditions for support to 
Rwanda’s economic recovery”49 before the genocide.50 Boyce and Pastor51 contend that unless 
peace building and political rehabilitation are allowed to reshape macro-economic policies, then 
both the peace process and economic policy are likely fail.
Rehabilitation assistance can accelerate the transition from a war economy to a livelihood and 
development friendly economy. But the issue is how best to provide economic rehabilitation 
assistance. International financial institutions, for example, concentrate on macro-economic 
relorm processes typified by the Economic Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme (ERRP) in 
Ethiopia - introduced in large part to reach a modus vivendi with the World Bank in 1991.
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NGOs, on the other hand, concentrate on smaller scale rehabilitation activities carried out at 
household, village, or community level. In practice the Bank’s approaches to macro­
rehabilitation are little adapted from non-war macro adjustment programmes which, however 
necessary, are not adequately articulated to sectoral and household rehabilitation needs nor to 
restoration of basic public services. With the partial exception of the few cases such as Ethiopia 
and Rwanda where the World Bank was involved in their design, rehabilitation programmes are 
carried largely in partnership with NGOs that often exclude macroeconomic rehabilitation from 
their programmes. Yet the success and sustainability of these programmes depend to a large 
extent on the macro-economic environment in which they are implemented. Concentrating 
attention on IFIs and NGOs can be deceptive. Overall rehabilitation strategies are necessarily 
domestically driven or doomed to failure.
Notes Toward a Processual Reconceptualisation o f Rehabilitation
\ *  ' t :
From the existing literature, its gaps and country experiences, which have been analysed above, 
it is possible to identify a set of potential building blocks toward reconceptualising rehabilitation 
during, and especially after, war as a strategic process. These fall into three clusters: conceptual 
perceptions, stages in rehabilitation and programmatic elements within rehabilitation processes. 
Due to empirical deficiencies these are set out as a tentative checklist. Conceptually more 
coherence and holism are needed. In practice most literature -  and most projects -  concentrate 
on the political, social, (micro) economic aspects of early post-conflict resettlement. There is 
frequently a move toward rebuilding a renewed development dynamic well after the end of 
overt conflict. Nevertheless, holism is rarely articulated in either the conceptual or de facto 
arena. ->
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To describe that period as “renewed development” is in practice misleading. The period prior to 
war has usually been one of severe tensions, political and economic unsustainability and of 
severe economic stagnation and regression. Semantically rehabilitation need not mean restoring 
as before nor return to some hypothetical long-term development turnpike. In practice any such 
attempt is almost sure to fail unless it is a symbolic political appeal to a pre-war golden (at least 
in fading memory) age which does not involve seeking to recreate specific policies, institutions 
or resource allocations. A second and related conceptual weakness is failure to be country 
centered. This is true in two senses: rehabilitation programming is often written and attempted 
to be applied as if it were identical across conflicts and countries or, at least, easily adaptable by 
fairly secondary changes. The second is that the bulk of the writing -  both conceptual and 
operational -  is from an outsider not a domestic perspective.
This is a somewhat peculiar imbalance. Reconciliation and therefore the aspects of 
rehabilitation which contribute to it, is inherently domestic. It cannot in any deep or lasting 
sense be externally imposed. The now general perception that structural adjustment 
programmes must be “owned” -  and therefore to a substantial extent designed and product 
differentiated -  by SSA (or other) states is logically even more relevant to post-war 
rehabilitation and reconciliation.
Clearly some aspects of both war and clawing back from its results are general both in respect to 
causes and their interaction and as to programmes/policy instruments and their 
implementation/phasing. But the value of comparative analysis and of toolkits of policies, 
programmes and analysis is likely to depend in large part on their grounding in case study 
analysis recognising divergences as well as commonalities. Somaliland’s history and dynamics 
are very unlike those of Burundi and Rwanda (or Ethiopia and Eritrea) and significantly
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divergent from those of Somalia. Making use of analytical or programmatic insights from other 
experiences productively depends on understanding these differences.
A third need is for deep, empirical analysis devoted to comprehension of the causes and 
dynamics of conflicts leading to (and remaining) after wars in order to have a basis for 
mastering them.52 The externally mandated crisis containment approach to war and (apparent) 
post-war situations is usually deeply deficient in comprehension. Perhaps the most serious 
general gaps are comprehension of history. Ahistoricism invariably leads to the substitution of 
misleading labels -  ethnicity, religion, genocide, and land pressure -  to structure current affairs. 
Externally and self ascribed ethnic identities are often -  though by no means always -  the result 
of conflict and a tool in manipulating, mobilizing for, and sustaining it as much as a pre-existing 
cause. Ascribed ethnic identities, once ossified, are however, real. The process of self­
ascription and the strategic aims and policies giving it shape, as illustrated in Rwanda and 
Kagera, can both accentuate or transcend armed conflict. >
The ‘resource scarcity’ label is of a similar genre. There is a paucity of land in Rwanda, 
Burundi, and the Horn and resource scarcities instigate tensions that can lead to war. It is no 
surprise, then, that wars are usually generated over conflicts relating to material resources and 
that the dynamics of war benefit certain actors. The Somali pattern of ‘peace lords’ 
(accountable elders and merchants) and ‘warlords’ (younger military specialists superseding the 
‘peacelords’ during wartime) sheds light on the war process there -  and on the limited utility of 
UN Peace Conferences that excluded elders. Paradoxically, conflict can induce both positive 
and negative shifts -  prominent ‘war lord’ merchants who have used war to further primitive 
accumulation have by their success, and in their own present self interest, become advocates and 
potent backers of peace.
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The Four Stages of Rehabilitation
Four stages of rehabilitation can be identified and distinguished conceptually. These are 
comprehension, survival support, initial post war rehabilitation and sustained rehabilitation 
toward renewed development . The time frame is from full-scale war to a situation in which 
post-war is no longer the principally defining characteristic. The stages can rarely be fully 
consecutive for action cannot be postponed until achieving full comprehension or full peace. 
Similarly, peace is frequently geographically and temporally partial.
Despite the fact that comprehension can begin prior to the rest of the rehabilitation process, 
conflicts are rarely sufficiently understood. This is because genuinely held perceptions - even if 
inaccurate - are contextual facts with results flowing from them but unlike objective exogenous 
realities are subject to rapid change for better or for worse. In addition, the interaction of 
various groups during the negotiation and reconciliation process often alters the reality being 
comprehended. Finally, there is less availability and access to the insights of operational actors 
in the context of on-going conflict. As a result, judgments are predicated, due to time and 
financial constraints, on narrowly conceived studies.
The overriding mission of the second phase, survival support, is to save lives - and thereby 
encourage future rehabilitation from the individual through to the national level. The principal 
means are through access to basic needs, including education. In the rehabilitation context, the 
focus is on delivery, and more specifically, on self-organization. But caveats in the self­
organization model exist. Groups mobilizing in Rwandan refugee camps (the RPF and 
Interahamwe) often self-organized to preserve and enhance their capacities to make war.
22
Namibia’s SWAPO had effective civil governance structures in its main camps in Angola and 
Zambia, acceptable because its aim of forcing South Africa to disgorge Namibia had wide donor 
support.
Though careful self-organisation of refugees is conceived widely, as a step away from 
dependence and toward rehabilitation of civil society and local government, it rarely happens. 
In the interest of the promotion of gender relations, women's involvement in camp organisation 
and the food system should be encouraged Indeed, most displaced persons/refugees do not wish 
to be idle but to engage in livelihood activities - not least because refugee/displaced person 
support is almost never adequate in quantity and always (by reason of technically 
insurmountable obstacles) non optimal in makeup. This tendency is often actively discouraged. 
While the viable opportunities vary from context to context, there are significant alternatives to 
confinement and restrictive policies. Alternatives include the hiring fewer expatriates and 
promoting larger infrastructural and household production components into relief efforts. These 
options are of increasing importance as the duration of their stay becomes increasingly longer- 
term.
Early post war rehabilitation includes a very substantial survival support component. 
Demobilisation, reintegration, and livelihood rebuilding requires both food and a minimum of 
rehabilitation of health, water and education facilities. To deliver in this new context requires 
both dispersed local (community, civil society and/or local governmental) and national 
(logistical, strategic, coordinating) domestic capacity. While a donor-NGO approach appears at 
first logical, it is likely to result in incoherence, gaps and cost inefficiency. Due in part to its 
complexity, the conceptualization and articulation of urban livelihood rehabilitation strategies 
are often less rigorous than for their rural counterparts. Indeed, in SSA urban livelihoods are
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dominated by both formal and informal wages, whereas rural are dominated by small farming 
(or herding) household enterprises. The packages of peace and security (law and order) tools 
plus the food, basic services, infrastructure and market access needed are at least in broad 
outline fairly well identified and agreed. In the urban case, self employment, small enterprise 
employment and large enterprise-led macro growth, sometimes with supporting interim jobs 
from infrastructure and housing reconstruction, tend to be argued for almost as if they were 
alternatives and with relatively limited articulation or relevant (successful) cases of 
implementation.
The early post war rehabilitation phase’s economic and political aspects interact in domestic 
governmental (and usually civil society) thinking but less so in that of external actors. National 
capital perspectives often outweigh coherence, coordination, and centralisation over local-level 
participation, flexibility and pragmatic identification of alternative ways forward. External 
actors often prioritize immediate elections, procedural transformations, and governmental 
service capacity than do domestic actors. Evidence suggests, however, that despite their 
symbolic value (from bullets to ballots) and their reconciliatory payoffs, instant elections and 
superficial procedural reforms are no panacea. For citizens, the emphasis often tends to be on 
the creation of a civilian police force and magistrates’court system to deal with internal issues of 
peace and security rather than constitutional and commercial law and the higher judiciary.53
Finally, sustained rehabilitation is marked by a more experientially and empirically grounded 
holistic strategy. It is characterised by the conversion of survival support inputs (e.g. food aid) 
to infrastructural finance/second (wage) income and livelihood support/commercial system 
supply stabiliser flows. Taking a household perspective, its primary foci are toward universal 
access to basic services, the provision of local infrastructure, and safety nets. Entry into this
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phase generally occurs a few years following the war and after the mobilisation of substantial 
resources. The best test of when rehabilitation ends is probably the point at which reversing war 
damage - to livelihoods, basic services, infrastructure, markets and institutions is of limited 




One can also explore rehabilitation through a cross-sectional political, economic and social 
framework. Though they are all interdependent, it is useful to differentiate the three sectors 
conceptually. The elements of political reconciliation and transformation particularly related to 
rehabilitation include:
1. General provision of finance - elections, parliaments, and public services all cost money and 
must be sufficiently financed to be efficient and credible.
2. Rebuilding basic service delivery capacity (including law and order). Capacity to deliver 
basic public services is a key to perceived legitimacy.
3. Sufficient accountability/transparency to limit opportunities for misallocation or arbitrary 
allocation of resources and to create a recognition of the value of the state and its 
government.
4. Decentralization of decision making which includes direct household and community 
participation in information provision, project design and prioritisation, outcome review and 
consequential programme adjustment.
5. Creation of a relevant progressive dynamic of household livelihoods and infrastructure. 
Introduce food security measures against calamities to create a climate of perceived state 
legitimacy and of macro-economic growth.
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The macro-economic importance of rehabilitation emerges in cases where local infrastructure, 
and basic services have been eroded or destroyed for communities who, prior to war, made 
significant contributions to national output, government revenue, domestic food supply 
(including that to urban areas), domestic enterprise markets, and to exports. Restoring these 
contributions is crucial not to mention cost efficient in contrast to massive infrastructural 
investments. Macro economic rehabilitation will need to be articulated not only sectorally but 
also provincially/regionally and at local governance unit level. In this sense rehabilitation 
requires institutional changes which represent reform of, not return to, the past which was rarely 
marked by either effective coordination or participatory decentralisation. Tools related to such 
rehabilitation include:
1. Restoration and improvement of basic infrastructure with special emphasis on 
neighbourhood and rural levels.
2. Restoration and extension of access to basic public services.
3. Restoration of law and order/peace and security for ordinary households and for medium 
and small-scale business people.
4. Enhancing market access for household, small producers, and small/medium enterprises by 
removing counterproductive regulation and improving access to credit.
5. Enabling rapid recovery of household livelihoods through intensive infrastructure 
(re)building by waged labour as a means of restoring the outside income component (crucial 
for households in pre-war contexts).
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6. Creating functional safety nets against calamities (linked to the first instrument - via work 
for food) to both maximize return on scarce resource allocations and to encourage morale.
7. Develop cooperative and co-financing arrangements with domestic civil society/social 
sector bodies engaged in similar endeavours.
Social rehabilitative programming is aimed to ensure equity and social cohesion (or limited 
animosity). As mentioned above, rehabilitation in this respect must not be restricted to merely 
reconstituting the pre-war situation because economic (and social) inequities as perceived 
within and among sectors of society are among the causes of conflict. Similarly, social and 
economic norms, such as the increase in female-headed households, often change during the 
course of war. Indeed two overlapping concerns within social rehabilitation are gender relations 
and land. War has often indirectly reversed discriminatory policies against female-headed 
households and almost always both affects land rights and creates new controversies over them.
However, much of the social sector impact of rehabilitation is spill-over. People who are better 
fed, clothed, educated with better access to food security and health services are likely to be less 
hostile to each other and to be willing to work together to expand these gains. Greater security - 
including prevention of all types of violence - clearly eases living together and makes for civil 
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